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NOTES AND COMMENT
Illegal Contracts; Fraud; Agreement Supported by Bond
Washington County v. Froelich Mercantile Co.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, February 5, 1929.
Washington County entered into a contract with the Froelich Mer-
cantile Company whereby the latter was to furnish the county with all
the cement for the paving season, and a refund would be made on every
empty sack returned to the Froelich concern. Washington County com-
plied with the contract, but, the Froelich Company refused to make a
refund as agreed between the parties. The contract made provision
for a bond which was posted by the Froelich Company for the faithful
performance of said contract. Having failed to fulfill their part of the
contract, the Mercantile Company is being sued on the bond. Plaintiff
claims that defendant is liable by reason of a bond given it by defendant
for the faithful performance of a contract entered into between the
plaintiff and the defendant, Froelich Mercantile Company. It is alleged
that the Mercantile Company failed to perform its part of -the contract,
and plaintiff demands judgment on the bond of said defendant for its
damage.
The defendant admits .the making of the contract and the giving of
the bond, but, alleges that he did not know, and plaintiff gave him no
notice, that plaintiff had -turned over property to the Mercantile Com-
pany pursuant to said contract, for which the Mercantile Company was
to make a refund, and in that respect, the plaintiff was guilty of gross
neglect, fraud, and disregard of defendant's rights. The defendant
alleges that -the contract was in violation of Seotion 348.28 of the
Statutes, and, for that reason the contract is void and of no effect, in
this-that one Froelich was at .the time of the making of such contract
a member of the county board of supervisors of the plaintiff's county,
and a member of the road and bridge committee, and was at the same
time a stockholder and pecuniarily interested in said Mercantile Com-
pany.
The contract is alleged to be void because made by faithless officials.
Notice of breach or default is not required to be given him in order
to maintain an action against him on his bond.' The bond is un-
conditional and no failure of duty on the part of the creditor will defeat
the obligation of the bond. 2 This defense based on the grounds of lack
of notice to the defendant does not state a defense to the action.
As to the second defense, based on the ground that the contract
is void and unenforceable, because it was entered into in violation of
the Statute, against malfeasance in office, it questions the intent and
19 Corp. Juris. Pages 81-85; 21 Riding Case Law, Page lO71; 96 Wis. 578.
2 Fanning v. Murphy, 126 Wis. 538--O5 N.W. lO56.
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purpose of the Statute. This contract was entered into in bad faith
and contrary to law, because Froelich was an officer of the county
and pecuniarily interested in his company and in the con-tract. He was
in a position where his judgment leaned more favorably towards his
pecuniary interests rather than the public interest and consequently he
was not acting faithfully for the good of the people he represented.
Now, the purpose of the Statute is to prevent the public from being
the victiin of loss through the misconduct of its officers. Generally,
it is held that a contract entered into in violation of a penal Statute is
void.3 But our Statute does not say that the county shall not contract
to build highways, but that its officers acting for the county in making
a contract shall not be financially interested in such contract. The
county considered in its corporate capacity, did no wrong. The contract
was within its public duty. Its officers violated the Statutes, became
criminally liable, and subject to heavy penalties. 4 The county, however,
was guilty of no offense, and therefore is not subject to a penalty, but,
it is subject to recover whatever damage it suffered because of the de-
fendant's failure to fully comply with the contract. Where the com-
plaining party is specially protected by the law, and the agreement is
not illegal per se, but merely prohibited, and the prohibition was in-
tended for his protection and the parties not being in pari delicto, he
is entitled to recover.- The fact that the penalty is imposed only on
the offending officer shows that the municipality or innocent party is
not to be penalized. Judgment was given for the plaintiff.
A distinction should be made between the corporate municipality and
the corrupt officers who represent it. In Norbeck & Nicholson Co. vs.
State 32 S.C. 189; 142 N.W. 847, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 229, it was held
that a contract specially prohibited by the constitution of the state could
not be enforced against the State, and stating that as a general rule,
such a contract is void. But, the. Court said: "To 'the general rule
there are exceptions which permit the party who has performed an
illegal contract, and who has parted with consideration, to recover such
consideration on the Quantum meruit or quantum valebat. One excep-
tion to this general rule is where the law itself provides for such recov-
ery. Another exception is where the parties are not in pari delicto, in
which case the party not participating in the wrong may recover his
consideration, but not the other party. It might be said that in the
present case, the defendant state is not in pari delicto, but this would
not apply to plaintiff nor to the state officials who entered into this
contract on behalf of the state."
3189 Wis. 343; 207 N.W. 697; 117 Wis. 446; 114 Wis. iS, 89 N.W. 892.
'Statute No. 348.28.
S 13 Corpis Juris 499.
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In Land, Log, and Lumber Co. vs. McIntyre, IoO Wis. 245; 75 N.W.
964, 69 Am. St. Rep. 915, this above distinction is brought out. There,
a member of the county board received money from the county on
such an illegal contract and the county not being in pari delicto was
allowed to recover the money so paid in a taxpayer's action. In Lauro
vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company 131 Wis. 555; III N.W.
66o, Justice Timlin presents many cases illustrating the general princi-
ple applicable in such cases. He there quotes with approval from Harris
vs. Runnels, 12 How. 72, "It must be obvious from such diversities
of legislation, that Statutes forbidding or enjoining things to be done,
with penalties accordingly, should always be fully examined before
courts should refuse to give aid to enforce contracts which are said
to be in contravention of them."
The late Chief Justice Vinje said -that the principle running through
the cases is this: "Not all contracts forbidden by statute are void."
The entire subject is admirably discussed, and numerous cases cited
which are to the point in a note at Page 618, 12 L.R.A. (NS). The
principle to be applied, which would give relief to the blameless party,
and the innocent victim, seems to be: Where the contract is not ex-
pressly prohibited by statute, where the contract is not Mallm per se,
or where the parties are not in pari delicto, courts will look to the
purpose and intent of the statute and give it effect accordingly.
STANLEY D. CELICHOWSKI
Lateral Support; Rights and Duties of, to Adjoining Landowners
The subject of lateral support touching on the rights and duties of
property owners to the same is of utmost importance to the practicing
lawyer of today. We are living in an age of concentration of forces
which has resulted in the upbuilding of large cities. The growth of
cities has greatly increased the value of property in certain districts.
Likewise the growth of cities has made for the concentration of forces
in particular districts for commercial purposes. The increase in value
together with the desirability of concentration has led to the utiliza-
tion of every foot of land by property owners. The above two forces
have likewise resulted in the placing of greater burdens on the land
through the building of higher buildings. Years ago when a man
built on his property he erected his building within his lot so that the
support from his own land was enough to protect his structure in case
his neighbor wished to excavate and build on his land. The immense
structures which are built today, usually extend to the edge of the
lot line. When the adjoining owner wishes to construct a building
on his lot, there is danger of the first building being damaged if some
means of support is not given during the time the excavation is being
